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Abstract
The importance analysis provides a means of analyzing the contribution of potential low-level sys-
tem failures to identify and assess vulnerabilities of safety-critical systems. Common approaches
attempt to enhance the system safety by addressing vulnerabilities using an iterative analysis
process, while considering relevant constraints, e.g., cost, for optimizing the improvements. Typ-
ically, data regarding the analysis process is presented across several views with few interactive
associations among them. Consequently, this hampers the identification of meaningful informa-
tion supporting the decision making process. In this paper, we propose a visualization system
that visually supports engineers in identifying proper solutions. The visualization integrates
a decision tree with a plot representing the cause-effect relationship between the improvement
ideas of vulnerabilities and the resulting risk reduction of system. Associating a component fault
tree view with the plot allows to maintain helpful context information. The introduced visual-
ization approach enables system and safety engineers to identify and analyze optimal solutions
facilitating the improvement of the overall system safety.
1998 ACM Subject Classification B.4.5 Reliability, Testing, and Fault-Tolerance, I.3.8 Appli-
cations, D.2.4 Software/Program Verification
Keywords and phrases fault tree analysis, importance and sensitivity analysis, information vi-
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1 Introduction
Fault tree analysis is a widely used technique for the identification of vulnerabilities of
safety-critical systems. This analysis uses a graphical model called fault tree to logically
relate undesired failures at the system level (called top event) with failures at the component
level (named basic events). A component fault tree is an advanced modularization concept
supporting the fault tree analysis of complex systems. This allows to extend the regular fault
tree model by decomposing it according to the architecture of the system under investigation
into a hierarchical representation where each component is represented by an extended fault
tree. The fault tree analysis provides a basis of the importance analysis and sensitivity
analysis of those failure relations. It mainly focuses on the risk contributions of individual
basic events to a top event. The important basic events represent the critical vulnerabilities
of a system. Sensitivity analysis is applied to investigate relations between changes of basic
events and the resulting impacts on a top event.
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In order to improve the system safety, engineers usually carry out an iterative risk reduction
approach consolidating importance and sensitivity analysis. As a result of the approach,
engineers may identify an improvement solution consisting of a group of modifications with
respect to system design. By a solution, the failure probability of top event is reduced to
an acceptable level. In many cases, engineers may identify multiple possible solutions by
various alternative design modifications in the analysis process. Thus, the safety improvement
process consists of the determination of modifications and the review of solutions by taking
the essential questions into account:
Aspects of modifications:
What are the most important basic events contributing to a system failure?
What are possible modifications of the system design?
What are the impacts of the modifications regarding system safety?
Which modifications are optimal taking certain constraints into consideration?
Aspects of solutions:
How good are the improvement solutions?
What is the best solution?
Usually, the data related to the questions is separated across individual views having various
representation forms, e.g., fault trees, tables, histograms, plots, and decision trees. However,
there are few interactive associations among the views. Mostly, engineers need to frequently
switch views for accessing meaningful data during the analysis process. Additionally, there
is no sufficient context information when engineers focus on a specific view. For example,
modifications are organized using a decision tree and the detailed data of the queried modifi-
cation is represented in a separate table. When focusing on the table of detail information,
the context with respect to the overview of modifications may be lost. Furthermore, when
analyzing the basic event corresponding to this modification, engineers need to manually
locate the basic event in the fault tree view because the decision tree does not provide this
information. Engineers spend more additional efforts for switching views and identifying
significant information.
In this paper, we propose a visualization system that effectively integrates data which
is essential for the analysis of the safety improvement process. To support the information
access within different contexts, we additionally provide suitable interaction possibilities.
The proposed visualization system facilitates to identify and analyze vulnerabilities of safety-
critical systems, as well as determine the optimal/appropriate solution(s) by simulating
system design modifications on an abstract level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the basic principles
of the (component) fault tree analysis, importance and sensitivity analysis, as well as the
related representation concepts. We introduce our visualization system in Section 3. We
review the proposed methods on the basis of a short application example in Section 4. The
conclusion is subject to Section 5.
2 Background
2.1 Safety Analysis
The term safety often refers to a state of a system where the danger of a personal injury
or property damage lies within an acceptable level [15, 13, 4, 24]. A failure is defined as an
inconsistent behavior that deviates from the given specification of a system or a component
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(a) Fault tree (b) Component fault tree
Figure 1 Fault tree and component fault tree. (a) A fault tree consisting of four basic events
connected by an AND-gate and two OR-gates. (b) The component fault tree model based on the
fault tree in (a), which contains a main component and sub component “C1” and “C2”. “C2” inputs
its failure to “C1” via ports.
[4, 24]. In this context a system is said to be safety-critical if the failure of the system could
cause consequences that harm people [18, 13, 31, 24]. Risk is a combination of the frequency
of a harmful failure and the severity of the harm caused by that failure [13, 24]. When
talking about safety analysis we often refer to a process whose goal is to provide a reliable
assessment and improvement of the risk of a safety-critical system [19, 20, 24]. To achieve
this a variety of methods and techniques exist, e.g., fault tree analysis.
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis (FTA) [13, 36, 35, 12] is a deductive method allowing to trace the causes
of an undesired system state back to its roots. The method is based upon the usage of so
called fault trees (FTs). A fault tree is a tree-like structure composed of different types of
nodes. The root of the tree termed top event represents the undesired system state (e.g.,
system failure or outtake). The leaves are basic events (BEs) that represent the low-level
failures which are connected by logic gates, such as “AND-gate”and “OR-gate”. The way
the leaf nodes are connected reflects how the low-level failures logically contribute to the
undesired system state (see Figure 1(a)).
The ordinary modularization concept of fault tree allows to partition the independent
sub-trees as modules. However, these modules are not be mapped to identify technical
components of the system design. To solve this issue, Kaiser et al. [17] proposed an advanced
modeling concept called component fault trees (CFTs). Technical components of a system
are represented as the corresponding CFT components in the component fault tree model.
The influences between technical components are transferred via in- and out-ports of CFT
components. In this way, engineers may treat each CFT component as a black-box. Figure
1 (b) shows an example of the concept of component fault tree. The component fault tree
modularizes the sub-trees as CFT components and replaces the sub-trees with rectangles in
the main component. The detailed sub-trees are separately represented in individual views.
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(a) Procedure of single solution construction
(b) Multiple solutions construction
Figure 2 Construction of improvement solutions.
2.3 Importance and Sensitivity Analysis
Importance analysis and sensitivity analysis are quantitative approaches for evaluating
(component) fault trees. Vesely et al. [35] suggested that, in general, more than 90% of the
failure probability of a top event is due to less than 20% of the basic events. This implies
that we only need to focus on a small subset of basic events having major contribution. To
identify those, we determine the importance of each basic event with regard to the failure
probability of the top event. Importance analysis considers both the failure probability and
the logical relations of basic events. The Fussell-Vesely (FV) importance measure [11, 27]
assigns each basic event an importance value between zero and one: the larger the value,
the more important the basic event in terms of influence on the top event. The sum over
the importance of all basic events of a system may be greater than one since, in some cases,
simultaneous failures of multiple sub-systems may cause the system failure [10]. On the
other hand, the sensitivity analysis investigates the resulting impact of changes applied to
the basic events on the top event [14, 35, 23]. It is used for analyzing the accuracy of basic
events as well as the effects of safety improvements [25, 7, 9].
2.4 Improvement of Safety-Critical Systems
The improvement of the system safety may necessitate design modification involving the
replacement of critical parts of the system by elements having a better failure performance
(substitution concept) or introduction of identical redundant parts (redundancy concept).
Finding a satisfying solution in general is a non-trivial task underlying constraints and
restriction for which formal methods are not always available. Generally, the procedure
associated with this approach iteratively applies a set of alternative modifications until the
complete solution is found, which reduces the risk of a system to an acceptable level. Taking
the results obtained from the improvement analysis into account, it is possible to derive such
solutions in a more guided fashion [7, 9, 8, 35, 25]. Each iteration consists of mainly three
steps (see Figure 2 (a)):
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Figure 3 Ordinary representations used by the analysis of safety improvement process. Im-
provement solutions are arranged by a decision tree [9]. The relevant data is distributed across
several views [1, 7, 32, 9]. Commonly used representations are fault trees, charts or tables to
show importance of basic events, and the summary of possible solutions, design modifications, and
individual risk reductions.
1. Perform the importance analysis to identify the basic event having the largest contribution.
2. Find the hardware component related to that basic event. Modify the system design
by replacing the component by another one featuring a better quality or by introducing
identical ones in order to increase redundancy.
3. Update the (component) fault tree model and assess the modification with respect to the
impact on the top event in terms of reduction of failure probability. If required, engineers
may determine the optimal modification under consideration of additional constraints,
e.g., the costs of the modifications. If a complete solution is found, i.e., the failure
probability of the top event is reduced to the goal value, stop the process, otherwise start
next iteration from step 1.
Constructing a solution necessitates to choose the proper basic event, and to decide for a
suitable design alternative. In many cases, multiple improvement solutions exist because
of multiple important basic events or/and various alternative design modification ideas
corresponding to the identical basic event (see Figure 2 (b)). After constructing solutions,
engineers may additionally identify the optimal one. An important assumption of the safety
improvement process is that basic events are stochastically independent so that the change
of a basic event does not influence other basic events.
2.5 Related Representation Concepts
Fault tree analysis tools provide the view on fault trees using standardized graphical symbols
(see Figure 1 (a)). The data of the fault tree, e.g., failure probability of the top events and the
basic events are represented by text or data-aggregated forms. Most fault tree analysis tools
[16, 28, 1, 7, 32, 9] summarize the importance of basic events using a data table. Faulttree+
[16] shows importance values in a table associated with table presenting the properties of
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events, e.g., failure probability. Relex Architect [28] provides a table in which users may filter
and show the importance of basic events belonging to a specific sub tree. RAMCommander
[1] additionally provides charts for the importance values, e.g., histogram, pie-chart, and
2D/3D scatter plot. BlockSim [29] assigns colors to the histogram according to the failure
probability of basic events. Additionally, BlockSim proposed a variant of pie-chart called
“square pie-chart” that anti-clockwise arranges the basic events in descending order with
respect to the importance values. Project CISA [7, 9] arranges data of design modifications
in separate views and logically links them to a decision tree that represents the summary of
improvement solutions (Figure 3).
A decision tree is a tree-based predictive model that is widely used for facilitating the
decision-making in many domains. It partitions a data set into subsets according specific
rules. The root represents the original data, the edges represent the partitioning rules,
and the non-root nodes represent the outcomes of different rules. To construct a decision
tree, the users need to quickly identify the nodes to be partitioned by navigating through
the tree. Decision tree is a good way to provide overviews about complex decision-making
process. Ankerst et al. [2, 3] applied an indentation diagram to represent a decision tree
for arranging the partitioning steps in data mining. The work [34] integrated decision trees
and data visualizations of attributes of each node for purposes at data classification. Pham
et al. [26] presented a decision tree using the sunburst layout to visualize machine-learning
algorithms. The decision trees represented by an icicle diagram were provided by the work
[21, 3, 6]. The icicle concept represented tree hierarchies without wasting display space.
Project PaintingClass [33] integrated parallel coordinates and star coordinates with a decision
tree for exploring classified multi-dimensional data. Barlow et al. [6] proposed a visualization
system that linked views of various decision tree layouts to represent the decision data of
data mining process.
3 Visualization for Safety Improvement
3.1 Requirements of Analysis Process
The safety improvement process of a system concentrates on two phases: construction of
solutions and review of solutions. Requirements of the analysis (in short “R”) are summarized
as follows:
Construction of solutions: A solution comprising a sequence of design modifications. It is
constructed by performing an iterative analysis procedure (see Figure 2). The steps are:
Step 1: identify the the important basic events (R1).
Step 2: apply and test the risk reduction hypothesis by different modifications.
∗ R2: identify the type of modification: substitution or redundancy.
∗ R3: identify the value of modification: change of failure probability of the initial
basic event.
∗ R4: identify the cost of modification.
Step 3: evaluate the results of risk reduction:
∗ R5: evaluate the update of the component fault tree model.
∗ R6: evaluate the impact of top event by design modification.
∗ R7: evaluate the cost-effectiveness of modification.
∗ R8: evaluate the gap between updated failure probability of top event and the goal
value.
Review of solutions: Reviewing the constructed solutions may facilitate the understanding
of solutions and determining the optimal ones resulting from the following requirement.
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Figure 4 Risk-state node for a design modification. (0) Risk state of top event. Color indicates the
level of failure probability of the top event. (1) Type of the modification. Circle indicates substitution
concept, while small triangle indicates redundancy concept. (2) Change of failure probability of
the corresponding important basic event. (3) Cost of the modification. (4) Cost-effectiveness of
the modification. (5) An edge connecting the node with its predecessor node. The vertical part
represents the resulting reduction of failure probability of the top event.
3.2 Visual Support for Construction of Solutions
3.2.1 Representing Design Modification
Along with performing the safety improvement process, the design modifications are sequen-
tially connected as a decision tree to construct one or more solutions (see Figure 3). A
branch of the decision tree is caused by either multiple important basic events or multiple
modification ideas. We finally apply the node-link diagram for representing the decision tree
by taking two points into consideration: readability and data integration. Barlow et al. [5]
evaluated the readability of the treemap layout, the sunburst layout, the node-link diagram,
and the icicle diagram. The authors conducted that the node-link diagram and the icicle
diagram were the most favorable for representing the tree structure data. The node-link
diagram has the sufficient space to integrate the visual attributes in nodes. However, the
icicle diagram (as well as treemap and sunburst layout) is a compact layout in which the
aspect ratio needs to be maintained for the semantic meaning. In this case, the nodes on the
deeper hierarchy of the tree do not have sufficient space for representing the attributes. In
sum, the node-link diagram is more appropriate for our decision tree than other layouts.
For understanding a modification, the cause (i.e., corresponding basic event) and the
effect (i.e., resulting risk state of system) is the primary information. In order to represent the
cause-effect relation, we place the modification nodes of the decision tree in a risk-reduction
plot (see Figure 5 (2)) where x-axis represents ordinal basic events, while the achieved change
in risk (in terms of failure probability) is projected along the y-axis that represents a range
from the initial failure probability of a top event to the goal value in a top-down direction.
We then introduce the visualization properties of the node-link decision tree. In order
to represent the associated significant data, for each modification, we propose a risk-state
node that consists of a central triangle icon and four attached visual items representing data
associated with the modification (see Figure 4).
Triangle icon: shows the risk state of the system corresponding to the modification.
This is the most significant data based on the updated component fault tree (with respect
to R5). In many cases, the safety and system engineers intend to quickly and roughly
estimate the change of risk of a system, e.g., by which step the failure probability is
reduced from critical level to moderate level. The shape of triangle is applied because
it is consistent with the shape of the top event of the component fault tree. Color is
recommended for representing the ordinal data by the work at [22]. The color of the
triangle depends on the level of failure probability described in Section 3.2.3. Using colors,
one may quickly estimate the criticality of the top event, and decide whether the failure
probability is acceptable or not. When the color becomes green, the risk reduction can
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Figure 5 Visualization system for improving system quality with respect to safety. (1) The
associated component fault tree view. (2) The risk-reduction plot. (3) The solution overview plot.
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be finished and the corresponding solution is complete. Additionally, the label of the
corresponding modification is presented below the icon.
Item 1: the type of modification (with respect to R2). The types are nominal data that
may be effectively represented by the graphical properties of position, color, texture,
connection, density, and shape. The graphical properties of position, color and connection
are already used in our visualization. Taking the size of the triangle icon into account, the
graphical property of density is not suitable, too. Thus, we apply shape for representing
the basic types of design modifications: a circle represents a component substitution
whereas a small triangle represents the introduction of redundant components.
Item 2: the reduction of the failure probability of the original basic event (with respect to
R3). If engineers replace the initial hardware, the value of the new part becomes current.
If engineers apply the redundancy concept, the new value is the failure probability of
the new sub-tree of the redundant parts. The difference between the failure probability
of the original basic event and the new basic event (or sub-tree) introduced represents
the improvement of the vulnerability being addressed. To present this information in an
intuitive way we have designed a bar graph using the graphical property of length that
is recommended for representing the quantitative data [22]. The bottom line of the bar
indicates the failure probability of the initial basic event. The filled part shows the new
value. The item provides information about the context under which the modification
has been applied. For example, following the substitution approach, it is possible to
intuitively compare the existing with the new part in terms of failure probability.
Item 3: the cost of modification (with respect to R4). In our work, the cost is an
value representing a quantity consumed for the modification, e.g., money, time, and
human-resources. The type of the cost needs to be defined at the beginning of the safety
improvement process. It is an important information for evaluating design modifications
(see Section 3.2.2) and solutions (see Section 3.3). We propose a scale bar to visualize the
cost not only for the comparison of cost of modifications but also for the investigation of
the absolute cost value. Engineers are allowed to define the scale of the bar, e.g., each
box represents 10 dollars.
Item 4: the cost-effectiveness ratio of a modification (with respect to R7). In cases where
multiple design modifications exist it is important to choose those providing the proper
balance between risk reduction and cost (see Section 3.2.2). We use the graphical property
of length to represent the quantitative cost-effectiveness. Thus, a bar is introduced to
represent the cost-effectiveness ratio for a given design modification. The larger the bar,
the more cost-effective the modification.
There are two possible ways to composite the central icon and the visual items: the inside
strategy and the outside strategy. When placing the visual items inside the central icon, the
icon needs to be enlarged. In this case, the large icon cannot exactly indicate its position
in the plot that represents significant semantic meaning of the analysis process. Thus, we
apply the outside composition strategy. We place the four visual items closely around the
central icon. The visualization properties corresponding to the method of the modification
(items (1) and (2)) are placed at the left; the factors of evaluation of the modification are
represented at the right (items (3) and (4)). This way, engineers may investigate the method
and evaluation of modification in the corresponding side.
We connect a new risk-state node with its direct predecessor using a two-part orthogonal
edge. A line between the predecessor node and the horizontal position of the new risk-state
node represents the subsequent design modification. The vertical part of that line represents
the reduction of the failure probability resulting from modification (with respect to R6).
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This provides a reliable basis for guiding the analysis process. When there are alternative
modifications for a basic event, multiple risk-state nodes are created. Between two nodes,
there is an even distance dividing the width of the x-axis scale of the basic event (see Figure
5: “M2” and “M3”). This may address the overlapping issues of edges as well as of nodes.
To conveniently identify important basic event(s) in each iteration of the analysis procedure
(with respect to R1), we present bars on a list of indicators of basic events along the x-axis
on top of the risk-reduction plot (the more important a basic event, the longer the bar).
Additionally, we provide a horizontal green line in the lower part of the plot for indicating
the goal value. This enables us to assess the distance from the goal (with respect to R8).
3.2.2 Identifying optimal Modifications
The decision tree of the analysis process may exponentially grow because of its number of
branches. Consequently, engineers might spend much efforts for analyzing a large set of
modifications. In this case, engineers need to identify the optimal design modification(s) in
each iteration of the process in order to effectively construct adequate solutions (with respect
to the step 3 of the analysis procedure). The commonly used criterion is the maximal cost-
effectiveness of the modification (referring to visual item (4)). Engineers may alternatively
apply the criteria with respect to the largest reduction of failure probability of the top event
(referring to the vertical position of risk-state node). The non-optimal modifications may
be refused leading to the termination of the corresponding branches. We assign black color
to fill up the risk-state node of the modification. This way, one can easily realize that the
modification was considered and has been refused.
3.2.3 Adapting Component Fault Trees
Fault trees provide meaningful information for the safety improvement process. We apply the
component fault tree in our visualization system instead of the ordinary fault tree because
the component fault tree additionally provides the possibility to link failure mechanisms with
the elements/components of the system design. According to the definition of the component
fault tree, a CFT component reflects an architectural component of the system model in
the design phase. This supports the identification of the vulnerable parts of the system
design corresponding to the important basic events identified. Additionally, the structure of
component fault tree supports the understanding of the effects of modifications along the
way a failure propagates through the system when reviewing solutions.
We provide a visually enhanced component fault tree view for supporting the safety
improvement process (see Figure 5 (1)). In order to associate the component fault tree view
with the risk-reduction plot, we project the ordinal data of the x-axis of the plot (i.e., basic
event list) according to their locations within the component fault tree view. This allows
to link information from both views. We provide interaction mechanism on the component
fault tree view in order to dynamically show the sub-trees of the desired CFT components.
Each sub-tree is arranged inside a gray blob that indicates the scope of the CFT component.
Our system automatically updates the component fault tree model in the background during
the analysis process. In order to quickly assess the updated failure probabilities of nodes of
the modified component fault trees, we propose a qualitative estimation method to classify
failure probabilities into three levels and assign them colors: critical level (red), moderate
level (yellow), and acceptable level (green).
In order to preserve the overview about the vulnerable basic events addressed in a solution,
we maintain the initial structure of the component fault tree during the safety improvement
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Figure 6 Pop-up window shows the updated logical structure of the CFT component with respect
to the modification “M1”. The new created sub-tree is arranged in a scope having a dotted border.
Two basic events were added and connected with the initial basic event using an AND-gate.
process. That means, by modification performed according to the redundancy concept, the
identified important basic events are not directly replaced by sub-trees. Instead, we adapt
the color of the initial basic event node with respect to the failure probability of either the
substitutional part or the new sub-tree of redundant parts. This can avoid disturbances
caused by subsequently updating the component fault tree.
In case engineers intend to review the modified structure of the component fault tree of
the specific design modification, our visualization system allows them to show a pop-up view
representing the updated logical structure by a right-click on a risk-state node. Instead of
displaying the whole component fault tree, the view only presents the structure of the CFT
component that contains the basic event related to the design modification. The adapted part
of the component fault tree is arranged in a scope indicated by a dashed border. This enables
us to intuitively and flexibly view the adapted structures of the component fault tree. This
is particularly useful for reviewing design modifications utilizing the concept of redundancy.
For example, Figure 6 shows the adaption of a CFT component by a modification. A parallel
redundancy is applied by adding two new homogeneous parts and connecting with the initial
basic event by an AND-gate.
3.3 Visual Support for the Review of Solutions
While the risk-reduction plot supports the construction of improvement solutions, the
overview of the solutions is not intuitive for analyzing the cost-related patterns of the
proposed solutions. Such as the trend of risk reduction and of cost increase. It is not suitable
for identifying the optimal solutions having the minimum total cost. Thus, we provide
a simple and effective plot to present an overview about these quantities (Figure 5 (3)).
The x-axis and the y-axis respectively represent the cost of modifications and the failure
probability of the top event. We present a triangular node on the overview plot for each
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modification. We provide a brushing-and-linking interaction between the risk-reduction plot
and the overview plot in order to simultaneously highlight the information associated with
the same design modification. Engineers may obtain an intuitive summary of solutions and
identify the optimal ones.
We focus on the reduction up to the goal value rather than the exhaustive risk reduction.
The overloaded reduction may lead to a large improvement, however, simultaneously also
take large costs. In our work, we assume that all complete solutions reduce the initial risk to
the same goal value. In this case, for estimating a solution, we consider the total costs of a
solution instead of the total cost-effectiveness because this has the identical risk reduction
effects to other complete solutions.
4 Application Example
We provide an example intended to illustrate the use of our system with respect to two
important aspects: construction of solutions and the review of existing solutions. The applied
data originates from a component fault tree of a safety-critical sub-system of an autonomous
mobile robot [30]. This model contains 30 basic events and 4 CFT components. The goal is
to identify the most cost-effective solution. The initial failure probability of the top event
amounts “1.2e-13”, the specified acceptable value is “1e-14”.
4.1 Construction Process
The construction process of the improvement solutions consists of three iterations that are
illustrated in Figure 5 and described as follows:
Iteration 1:
Step 1: Identifying of the important basic event(s). We identify the important basic
event by examining the bars on the indicators of the risk-reduction plot. The basic
event “E32” proves to be more important than others.
Step 2: Applying design modifications. By viewing the labels of the blobs in the
component fault tree view, we know that the basic event belongs to the CFT component
“SC1”. According to this, we may easily identify the corresponding hardware component
of the system. Based on experience, we decide to replace the identified hardware
component with a new part. The cost of this modification amounts to 10 units
(see Figure 5: modification “M1”). The structure of the component fault tree is
automatically updated according to the modifications performed and a new risk-state
node appears on the risk-reduction plot. A solution “S1” is being constructed starting
from this modification. By having a closer look at the solution, we come to the
conclusion that the overall failure probability is not acceptable yet because the color
of the node is not green. Thus, we start the next iteration.
Iteration 2:
Step 1: Identifying of the important basic event(s). The basic event “E3” is identified
as the important one.
Step 2: Applying design modifications. There are two possible ways to modify the
system design for addressing this basic event. One is to add an homogeneous redundant
component causing the costs of 11 units (see Figure 5: “M2”). Another one is to use a
substitute causing the costs of 34 units (see Figure 5: “M3”). Because of the branches
of the modification ideas, a new solution “S2” appears for the branch of “M3”.
Step 3: Evaluating the modifications. We compare the cost-effectiveness bars of both
created risk-state nodes (referring to item (4)). The modification “M2” is obviously
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Figure 7 Qualitative evaluation.
more cost-effective. Hence, we abandon “M3” and terminate the corresponding solution
“S2” (the last modification step of the solution “M3” is filled with black). The failure
probability resulting from the updated component fault tree is not acceptable yet.
Thus, we still need to perform the next iteration of risk reduction.
Iteration 3:
Step 1: Identifying of the important basic event(s). We identify two important basic
events having similar values.
Step 2: Applying design modifications. We apply redundancy-related modifications
(“M4” and “M5”) for the both basic events. A new solution “S3” appears for the
branch generated by “M5”.
Step 3: Evaluating the modifications. We decide to approve both modifications because
the bars of the cost-effectiveness have similar length. The colors of both of the newly
created risk-state nodes are now green. This indicates that the risk of the component
fault tree is reduced to an acceptable level by applying either “S1” (ending in “M4”)
or “S3” (ending in “M5”). Because all the possible solutions are identified, we stop the
construction process at this iteration.
4.2 Review Process
In this section, we review the solutions in the overview plot (see Figure 5 (3)) for identifying
the optimal one. The fact that the total costs of solution “S3” is less than those of “S1”
yields that “S3” is the more optimal way to improve the system safety.
5 Evaluation
We have performed an informal evaluation for our visualization approach. We invited four
experts of the safety domain from the University of Kaiserslautern, all having profound
proficiencies in the field of (component) fault tree analysis. We first introduced our approach
to the participants, and then they were allowed to personally experience the visualization
functionalities. Tasks with respect to the safety improvement process were provided for
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the experience. Finally, the participants filled a Likert scale questionnaire for a qualitative
evaluation.
The results (see Figure 7) showed that the feedback was mostly positive. The risk-
reduction plot was preferred because this visually provided a sequence of modifications, while
intuitively presenting the important data of each modification in the same view. When
comparing modifications or analyzing patterns, using the plot was more intuitive than
investigating data in separate views. The bars for the importance of BEs also had good
reviews because they were easy to understand and dynamically linked to the visualization of
the modifications.
The risk-state node visualizing the modification data had got a little different opinions.
Most complaints concentrated on the small size of the node. The graphic properties attached
to the node was too small to be effectively used, particularly the comparison of the cost-
effectiveness bars. A suggestion was to apply an interactive fish-eye zoom for the interesting
node. A participant commented that a small risk-state node with all graphic properties
looked crowded. For example, although the attributes of modifications (i.e., the modification
cost, modification type, and modification value) provided significant information for analysis
of the existing modifications, the graphical representations of the data did not play an
important role when identifying a modification. He suggested to dynamically represent the
data: show specific graphic properties only when requested.
The representations for the effects of modifications had good comments. Participants
could clearly understand how much the risk reduced by a modification is and how much
the actual risk still needed to be reduced. Considering the different points of the analysis
view, participants also positively commented the overview plots of the solutions. For the
adaptation of the CFT structure, participants commonly thought that the views for showing
CFT structure was relative small, whether for the pop-up view or for the main CFT view.
The suggestions included a size adjustable pop-up view, and space-efficient alignment between
the main CFT view and the risk-reduction plot.
In sum, the invited domain experts preferred our approach because they believed that the
proposed visualization methods and interactions could effectively facilitate the identification
and analysis of the improvement solutions.
6 Conclusion
A safety-critical system may be improved by a set of design modifications developed by
using a component fault tree-based safety improvement process. In case, where multiple
design solutions exist the proposed method allows to identify appropriate solutions by taking
the actual costs into account. Traditional representation methods separate the information
generated in the safety improvement process across individual views which hampers the
identification of solutions. We propose a visualization system that integrates all information
that is relevant in a risk-reduction plot associated together with a component fault tree view.
This allows to quickly identify and review individual design modification steps in the context
of different solutions, while considering the optimization of solutions with respect to the
cost of modifications. An assumption of our approach is that design modifications do not
introduce new critical failures. Otherwise, we would need to apply additional modification
steps for the newly introduced important basic events. We also assume that engineers address
a vulnerability by only one design modification in a solution. In general, our visualization
system supports engineers to identify a series of design modifications leading to an significant
improvement of the overall system safety.
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